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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, many bank loans contain performance pricing provisions, which stip-
ulate that the coupon paid rises if the firm’s financial performance deteriorates and/or vice
versa. Financial performance is measured either by the borrower’s credit rating or a financial
ratio such as leverage. The theoretical literature has linked the use of performance-sensitive
debt (PSD) to debt renegotiation costs, signaling, and asset substitution considerations.
Asquith et al. (2005) argue that PSD reduces debt renegotiation costs due to adverse se-
lection, moral hazard, or unanticipated changes in the borrower’s credit risk. Manso et al.
(2010) demonstrate that PSD can be used as a signaling device for a firm’s credit quality in
a setting with adverse selection. Finally, Koziol and Lawrenz (2010) show that PSD can mit-
igate risk-shifting incentives, but Bhanot and Mello (2006) argue that PSD is an ineﬃcient
method to reduce incentives for asset substitution.
In this paper we explore a new explanation for the use of PSD. We hypothesize that
PSD can be used to mitigate hold-up problems, which, for example, can arise in long-term
lending relationships. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) show that a cost of relationship
lending is the potential for hold-up by the lender. The potential for hold-up arises from the
information advantage, which the lender acquires in the course of the lending relationship.
This information advantage makes it diﬃcult for the borrower to switch to another, less well
informed, lender due to adverse selection, which is especially relevant for opaque borrowers
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with fewer financing alternatives. If the borrower is "locked in", the bank could exploit
the situation by charging higher interest rates or by denying interest rate reductions when
the borrower’s performance improves. Schmidt (2006) argues that the use of covenants,
which is common in private debt contracts, further exacerbates the hold-up problem because
covenants shift bargaining power from borrowers to lenders. Von Thadden (1995) shows
that a solution to this hold-up problem is to pre-specify contract terms ex ante, thereby
limiting the discretion of the lender. Indeed, one can view PSD contracts as limiting the
discretion of the lender because making the coupon of a loan contingent on the borrower’s
performance avoids debt renegotiations in these states. For example, rather than renegotiate
a loan after a covenant violation, the performance-pricing provision specifies the outcome of
such renegotiation ex ante and thus avoids the situation of a technical default.1
In syndicated deals, the presence of a relationship lead-arranger is likely to reduce the use
of PSD. In the decision to hold-up a client a lender needs to weigh the short-term gains from
hold-up against the long-term costs of jeopardizing the relationship. In a syndicated deal,
the short-terms gains from hold-up would be shared by all syndicate members, while the
long-term costs of jeopardizing the relationship would be borne mostly by the relationship
lender. Thus, a relationship lead-arranger is more likely to favor to continue the relationship
and benefit from its information advantage relative to other lenders rather than to hold-up
1 While PSD is common place in private debt markets, PSD is rare in public bond markets. This is consistent
with our hypothesis, as hold-up problems are of little concern in public debt. Using keyword searches on
both Bloomberg and EDGAR Pro we are able to identify only 115 performance-sensitive bond issues from
74 distinct companies between 1989 and 2012.
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a client.
Our paper is the first to explicitly analyze the link between the hold-up problem in
repeated lending relationships and the use of PSD contracts. A particular advantage of
focusing on lending relationships is that it allows us to diﬀerentiate the hold-up from the
signaling motivation. This is because signaling is less important in lending relationships,
as the relationship lender already has an information advantage (see for example Menkhoﬀ
et al. (2006)), while the potential for hold-up rises in lending relationships. Using a large
sample of private debt contracts issued by non-financial U.S. borrowers between 1993 and
2011, we show that accounting-based PSD contracts, i.e., PSD based on a financial ratio,
are about 25% more likely to be used in repeated lending relationships after we control for
the endogeneity of the lending relationship. Following Bharath et al. (2011), we use the
spherical distance between the borrower’s and the lender’s headquarters as an instrument
for relationship strength. In contrast, we find that the use of rating-based PSD is negatively
related to the presence of a repeated lending relationship. Thus, these initial results suggest
that accounting-based PSD are used to address hold-up while rating-based PSD is used for
signaling.
We further analyze whether the use of PSD varies systematically across diﬀerent types of
borrowers because the potential for hold-up is also a function of borrower characteristics. For
example, Santos and Winton (2008) argue that the costs of relationship lending are higher for
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companies, which do not have access to other financing sources (e.g., bond market access).
In line with this argument, we find that accounting-based PSD contracts are more common
in relationship lending arrangements with smaller firms, firms that do not have a long-term
issuer credit rating at the time of the loan origination, and firms with lower analyst coverage.
If a loan is syndicated, performance pricing provisions are more likely, which is consistent
with the renegotiation cost argument by Asquith et al. (2005). However, the presence of a
lending relationship between the borrower and the lead arranger reduces the use of PSD.
This is consistent with the argument that in a syndicate the lead arranger cannot capture
all rents from hold-up, causing hold-up to be a less attractive strategy for the lead arranger
than preserving the relationship with the client.
Next, we examine the structure of covenants in PSD because if performance pricing
provisions are used to mitigate hold-up problems, then there should be a substitution eﬀect
between the pricing grid of rate-increasing PSD2 and covenant tightness. Covenants should
be less tight compared to covenants of regular debt.3 This is what we find. Firstly, the
majority of PSD have covenants on the same performance measure as the one used in the
performance-pricing provision, with covenant thresholds typically set directly at the end of
the pricing grid. Secondly, Debt-to-EBITDA covenants, the most common covenant type in
our loan sample, are less tight in PSD contracts that also use Debt-to-EBITDA as a measure
2 PSD that allows for interest rate increases only.
3 Small deteriorations in a borrower’s performance, which would otherwise trigger a technical default now
automatically lead to interest rate increases as determined by the pricing grid.
5
of the borrower’s performance compared with non-PSD debt contracts. Consistent with the
substitution hypothesis, this eﬀect exists only for interest-increasing PSD contracts.4
Finally, we examine the evolution of the borrower’s credit rating and the borrower’s lever-
age ratio up to 2 years following the issue of PSD, to diﬀerentiate hold-up from the possibility
that PSD is used to signal credit quality, as proposed by Manso et al. (2010). Under the
signaling hypothesis, the firm’s performance should improve following a PSD issue, while the
hold-up hypothesis makes no prediction about the firm’s post-issue performance. We find
that borrowers’ credit ratings tend to improve and leverage ratios decline 1-2 years follow-
ing the issue of rating-based PSD, but not for accounting-based PSD. These results further
support our conclusion that accounting-based PSD is used to address hold-up problems in
repeated lending relationships, while rating-based PSD is more likely used to signal credit
quality.
We make two contributions to the literature. Firstly, we oﬀer a new explanation for
the use of PSD, namely that PSD reduces potential hold-up problems in repeated lending
relationships. In contrast, Manso et al. (2010) argue that borrowers use PSD to signal their
credit quality, while Koziol and Lawrenz (2010) argue that PSD reduces moral hazard. The
study that is closest to our own is Asquith et al. (2005), who argue that the use of PSD
reduces debt renegotiation costs. In contrast to renegotiation costs, however, hold-up does
4 Nikolaev (2012) shows that PSD contracts are less likely to be renegotiated than regular debt, which is
also consistent with the substitution hypothesis.
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not arise in all situations and implies a wealth transfer between borrower and lender.
Secondly, we add to the literature on hold-up in repeated lending relationships. Several
authors find evidence that is consistent with the presence of hold-up. Saunders and Steﬀen
(2011) find that private firms pay higher loan spreads than public firms if borrowing from a
relationship bank. Hale and Santos (2009) show that banks reduce the interest rates on loans
after a client successfully issued its first public bond. Santos and Winton (2008) find that
(all else equal) loan spreads of bank-dependent borrowers rise more during recessions than
loan spreads of borrowers who have access to public debt markets. Mattes et al. (2012) find
that capital-constrained (European) banks charge borrowers with high switching costs higher
loan spreads than well-capitalized banks. This eﬀect prevails only during recessions. Degryse
and Cayseele (2000) find evidence for a deterioration of contract terms over the duration
of the lending relationship for a sample of European firms.5 As argued by Boot (2000),
maintaining multiple bank relationships can be one potential solution for this problem.6
However, Ongena and Smith (2000) show that this may reduce the availability of credit,
5 There is also considerable evidence of the benefits of lending relationships. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find
that the duration of a bank-firm relationship does not influence the contracted loan rate, but Berger and
Udell (1995) document that rates on lines of credit and collateral requirements decrease with the duration
of the bank-firm relationship. Bharath et al. (2011) find that repeated borrowing from the same lender
translates into a 10-17 bps lowering of loan spreads, and that relationships are especially valuable when
borrower transparency is low. See Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Freudenberg et al.
(2013), Berlin and Mester (1998), Bharath et al. (2007), Bharath et al. (2011), and Schenone (2010) for
further empirical evidence on the benefits of lending relationships.
6 Houston and James (1996) find that firms with a single bank relationship use less bank debt, as growth
opportunities are higher. Farinha and Santos (2002) find that firms with higher growth opportunities
or greater bank dependence are more likely to switch to multiple bank relationships. All of the above-
mentioned evidence is consistent with the notion that multiple bank relationships reduce the hold-up
problems.
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because increased competition reduces the value of information acquisition and hence the
incentive to lend to "young" firms.7 We extend this literature by linking the use of PSD to
the hold-up problem in repeated lending relationships.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses. Sec-
tion 3 describes the sample selection process, outlines the construction of variables, and
presents some descriptive findings. Section 4 contains the main empirical analysis, which
demonstrates a link between relationship lending and the use of performance pricing provi-
sions. Section 5 explores alternative explanations, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) show that a long-term lending relationship creates an infor-
mation asymmetry between the relationship lender and other potential lenders, which can be
costly for the borrower. Adverse selection can make it diﬃcult for the borrower to switch to
another lender. In this case the relationship lender could take advantage of its information
monopoly and extract some rents from the borrower, especially in the event of covenant vio-
lations, when much bargaining power rests with the lender (see Chava and Roberts (2008)).
Von Thadden (1995) argues that one way of reducing this hold-up problem is to limit the
7 The availability of funds to young firms without a track record is one potential benefit of relationship
lending as shown by Petersen and Rajan (1995). Banks can "subsidize" borrowers in earlier periods in
return for higher rents in future periods when the banks have an information monopoly.
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discretion of the lender by using pre-specified contract terms. PSD can be interpreted as
such a pre-specification of contract terms. PSD contracts specify higher (lower) interest pay-
ments if the borrower’s performance deteriorates (improves) in the future. A performance
deterioration could trigger a covenant violation, which would subject the borrower to hold-
up. In the case of PSD, however, there would be no technical default situation since interest
rate increases have been negotiated ex ante in the case of performance deteriorations. Simi-
larly, a performance improvement could cause the borrower to request improved loan terms.
A relationship lender may hold-up the borrower and deny any changes to the loan terms
knowing that the borrower is locked in the relationship. In the case of PSD, however, there
would be an automatic adjustment to the loan terms if the borrower’s performance changes.
Thus, a PSD contract limits the discretion of the lender and therefore can reduce hold-up in
long-term lending relationships.8 This gives rise to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a Relationship loans are more likely to include performance-pricing provisions
than non-relationship loans.
In contrast, Manso et al. (2010) argue that PSD is used to signal a firm’s credit qual-
ity. Relationship lending provides an excellent setting to disentangle the two hypotheses
because hold-up is more likely in repeated relationship lending, while the need for signaling
is less likely. There is little need to signal if the lender possesses an information advantage
8 A performance pricing provision can also be valuable for a lender who is trying to attract high quality
borrowers because PSD is a commitment device not to expropriate the borrower ex post.
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already (see Menkhoﬀ et al. (2006)). Thus, if the use for PSD is motivated by signaling
considerations, we expect a negative relation between relationship lending and the use of
PSD.
Hypothesis 1b Relationship loans are less likely to include performance-pricing provisions
than non-relationship loans.
Santos and Winton (2008) argue that the severity of the hold-up problem can vary sys-
tematically across diﬀerent types of borrowers. For example, the degree to which a borrower
is "locked-in" in a lending relationship depends on the availability of other financing sources,
such as public bond market access, and the opaqueness of the borrower. This gives rise to
our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Firms with fewer outside financing alternatives, which borrow from a rela-
tionship lender are more likely to use performance-sensitive debt.
When renegotiating a loan, a relationship lender must weigh the short-term benefits of
holding-up the borrower against the long-term benefits of maintaining the relationship. In
syndicated deals the lead arranger must share the benefits of hold-up with the rest of the
syndicate, while the benefits of the relationship accrue mostly to the relationship lender.
Therefore, a relationship lead arranger in a syndicate should be less likely to hold-up a
borrower, so that the use of performance-pricing provisions should be less likely compared
to non-relationship loans. We therefore expect that
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Hypothesis 3 Syndicated relationship loans are less likely to include performance-pricing
provisions than syndicated non-relationship loans.
Covenants especially present an opportunity for hold-up, because after covenant viola-
tions, lenders have much bargaining power vis-a-vis their borrowers. The most common
consequence of covenant violations is that the coupon the borrower has to pay is revised up-
ward. To eliminate hold-up in these situations, the coupon increases could be pre-contracted
using performance-pricing provisions. The threshold at which a covenant ultimately kicks
in would then have to be set higher than in the absence of a performance-pricing provision.
Thus, there is a substitution eﬀect between the use of a pricing grid and the tightness of the
respective covenant. Figure 1 illustrates this graphically.
[Figure 1 here]
We therefore test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 Interest-increasing performance-sensitive loans have less tight covenants on
the same performance measure, which is also used in the pricing grid.
Manso et al. (2010) argue that PSD is used to signal a firm’s credit quality. If so, a firm’s
credit quality should improve on average following the issuance of PSD. In contrast, the hold-
up hypothesis makes no prediction with respect to the borrower’s post issue performance.
We therefore test the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 5 The issuer’s performance improves (does not improve) following the issue of
PSD.
3. Data description
We obtain our loan sample from the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan
(LPC’s Dealscan) database, which contains detailed information on corporate loan issues.
We restrict our sample to loans issued by U.S. non-financial borrowers between 1993 and
2011.9 Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Berg et al. (2013), Bharath et al. (2007)),
we conduct our analysis on the facility (tranche) level. We obtain information on loan char-
acteristics such as maturity, the loan amount (scaled by total assets), number of covenants,
as well as the loan purpose and loan type. In addition, we record whether a loan is secured
or not. We then merge our loan data with borrower-specific information obtained from Stan-
dard and Poor’s Compustat North America database, such as firm size, market-to-book etc.,
from the last available fiscal quarter before the loan issue.10 The Appendix contains the
definitions of all variables used in our analysis.
9 Prior to 1993, virtually no contracts include a performance-pricing provision according to Dealscan. As
PSD clearly existed prior to 1993, we conclude that Dealscan’s data quality with respect to PSD is
insuﬃcient prior to 1993.
10We use Michael Robert’s Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database to merge Dealscan with Compustat (see
Chava and Roberts (2008)).
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3.1. Performance-sensitive debt contracts
The most common performance measure used in PSD contracts is the Debt-to-EBITDA ra-
tio (⇠ 48% of all PSD loans issued by U.S. borrowers) followed by the issuer’s senior debt
rating (⇠ 26%). Dealscan also reports the exact pricing grid, i.e., the function, which links
the coupon payments to the performance measure. Figure 2 shows the pricing grid of a
loan issued by Urban Outfitters Inc. in September 2007. The spread paid by Urban Outfit-
ters increases with its Debt-to-EBITDA ratio (an accounting-based PSD). Urban Outfitter’s
Debt-to-EBITDA ratio at the time of the issue was 4, implying that this loan is an example
of a rate-increasing contract. Figure 3 shows the pricing grid of a loan issued by IBM in
March 2004. In this contract, the loan spread changes with IBM’s senior debt rating (a
rating-based PSD). Since IBM’s senior debt rating at the time of the issue was A+, this loan
is an example of a rate-increasing and rate-decreasing contract.
[Figures 2 & 3 here]
3.2. Measuring relationship strength
We follow Bharath et al. (2011) and construct three proxies for the strength of the lending
relationship between borrower and lender. To construct these proxies, we first need to
identify the lead lender(s) for each loan contract. As in Sufi (2007), we classify a lender
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as the lead lender if the variable "Lead Arranger Credit" (provided by LPC’s Dealscan)
takes on the value "Yes", or if the lender is the only lender specified in the loan contract.
Next, we search the borrowing record of the borrower over the past five years. The first
proxy for the strength of the lending relationship, Rel(Dummy), is a dummy variable, which
equals one if the firm borrowed from the same lead lender in the previous five years and zero
otherwise.11 If there are multiple lead lenders in a loan, we calculate the proxy separately
for each lender and assign the highest value to the loan. The second proxy, Rel(Number),
measures the relative number of loans obtained from the relationship lender. For bank m
lending to borrower i, it is calculated as follows.
Rel(Number)m =
Number of loans by bank m to borrower i in the last 5 years
Total number of loans by borrower i in the last 5 years
(1)
Again, the highest value is assigned to a loan if there are multiple lead lenders. The third
proxy, Rel(Amount), measures the relative loan amounts obtained from the relationship
lender. For bank m lending to borrower i, it is calculated as follows.
Rel(Amount)m =
Loan amount by bank m to borrower i in the last 5 years ($)
Total amount of loans by borrower i in the last 5 years ($)
(2)
11Dealscan often classifies borrowers at the subsidiary level, e.g., General Electric Capital Canada and
General Electric Capital Corp of Puerto Rico are two distinct borrowers in Dealscan. By using the Michael
Robert’s Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database, all wholly-owned subsidiaries are eﬀectively aggregated
under the ultimate parent. We apply the same procedure to lenders. This procedure is important to ensure
that, e.g., a switch from Lehman Brothers Inc [Frankfurt] to Lehman Brothers Asia is not classified as an
actual lender switch. Not aggregating the borrowers and lenders under the ultimate parent, however, does
not aﬀect our results qualitatively.
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Again, the highest value is assigned to a loan if there are multiple lead lenders.
3.3. Measuring the tightness of covenants
As noted by Demiroglu and James (2010), covenant slack, i.e., the diﬀerence between the
covenant variable at the initiation of the loan agreement and the covenant threshold, is an
intuitive measure of covenant tightness. However, the degree of tightness also depends on
the volatility of the covenant variable and is thus firm-specific. We therefore follow Dichev
and Skinner (2002) and define covenant tightness as the diﬀerence between the covenant
variable at the initiation of the loan agreement and the covenant threshold, normalized by
the standard deviation of the covenant variable over the previous 8 years.12 Since various
definitions of leverage and liquidity ratios are used in practice, we restrict our analysis to
covenants on the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio, which, as Dichev and Skinner (2002) note, has the
most consistently used definition.
12The tightness of covenants can also be measured by a covenant intensity index that ranges from zero to
six, with higher values indicating stricter covenants as proposed by Bradley and Roberts (2003). The
index is constructed by summing indicator variables on dividend restrictions, equity sweep, asset sweep,
debt sweep, securitization and a binary variable that equals one if the contract includes two or more
financial covenants. Murfin (2012) further considers covariation between the diﬀerent covenant variables
when measuring contract strictness. We do not use these indices because we are interested in the tightness
of a particular covenant rather than general covenant tightness.
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3.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample consisting of 25,900 loan tranches issued
by 4,958 distinct borrowers between 1993 and 2011. Following Bharath et al. (2011), the
data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove outliers. Panel A reports loan
characteristics, which are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Sufi (2007)). For example, the
mean/median tranche amounts in our sample are $314/$110 million, which is large given
the mean/median book value of assets of $3,287/$657 million and an average leverage ratio
of 29%. The average all-in-drawn spread is 204 basis points, and the average maturity is
3.75 years. 74% of loan tranches are credit lines. Consistent with Manso et al. (2010),
roughly 47% of loans include a performance-pricing provision. Panel B reports borrower
characteristics. In 55% of cases, borrowers do not have a credit rating, but if a rating exists
it tends to be around the investment grade threshold. Panel C reports descriptive statistics
on the three relationship lending proxies. A lending relationship exists in 62% of all loan
contracts. On average, 42% of the total capital raised over the course of 5 years was raised
from the same lead lender.
[Table 1 here]
Table 2 shows the various performance measures used in PSD contracts. The most
common performance measure is the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio (48%), followed by the senior
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debt rating (26%). The remaining performance measures are mostly other leverage ratios. In
at least 4% of cases, multiple performance measures are used. We define PSD as accounting-
based PSD whenever a financial ratio is used as a measure of firm performance. Rating-based
PSD comprise all PSD contracts, which use the borrower’s credit rating as a performance
measure.
[Table 2 here]
4. Results
4.1. Lending relationships and the use of performance-sensitive debt
We begin by analyzing the interaction between lending relationships and the choice between
PSD and straight debt. As noted in Section II, we distinguish between accounting-based
and rating-based PSD. We therefore estimate a multinomial logistic regression.
PSDit = ↵ + ↵Ind + ↵t + ↵Rat +   ⇤Rel(M)it +   ⇤Xit + ✏it (3)
The dependent variable, PSD, is a discrete variable, which equals one if the loan contract
contains a performance pricing provision on an accounting measure, two if the loan contract
includes a performance pricing provision on the borrower’s credit rating, and zero in the case
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of straight debt (control group). Rel(M) represents one of our three measures of relationship
strength, and X are control variables to control for heterogeneity in borrower and loan
characteristics. We use firm size, measured by the log of total assets, the market-to-book
ratio of assets, leverage, tangibility, profitability, the current ratio, the loan amount (scaled
by total assets), the deal maturity, and an indicator variable for secured loans as control
variables. We also include loan purpose and loan type indicators, time fixed eﬀects, industry
fixed eﬀects, and dummy variables for each rating level. We cluster the standard errors at
the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. Table 3 reports the
regression results.
[Table 3 here]
Consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we find that relationship strength is positively
and significantly correlated with the use of accounting-based PSD and negatively related to
the use of rating-based PSD. These results suggest that accounting-based PSD may be used
to address hold-up, while rating-based PSD may be used for signaling. This conclusion is
intuitive on two accounts. Firstly, there are virtually no covenants on a borrower’s credit rat-
ing, while covenants on accounting ratios are common. Since covenant violations are a cause
for hold-up, any PSD that is to reduce the potential for hold-up should be accounting-based
rather than rating-based. Secondly, if rating-based PSD is used for signaling then it follows
from Hypothesis 1b that it is used less frequently in the presence of lending relationships
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because the relationship lender already possesses an information advantage, which reduces
the need for further signals.13
Consistent with the existing literature on PSD (e.g., Tchistyi et al. (2011)), larger loan
amounts are more likely to include a performance-pricing provision. Loan maturity is pos-
itively correlated with the use of accounting-based PSD, which is consistent with Asquith
et al. (2005)’s hypothesis that performance-pricing provisions are used in contracts with a
higher renegotiation likelihood. Loan contracts are more likely to be renegotiated the longer
the maturity. Larger borrowers are less likely to include an accounting-based performance-
pricing provision in the loan contract, possibly because large borrowers have more financing
alternatives and therefore are less subject to hold-up. These initial results show that it is
accounting-based PSD contracts, which may be motivated by hold-up due to lending rela-
tionships, while rating-based PSD are unlikely to be motivated by hold-up considerations.
In the following analysis, we therefore exclude rating-based PSD and return to the issue of
signaling in Section IV.
The analysis so far presents mostly cross-sectional evidence. However, our control vari-
ables may not fully capture all diﬀerences between relationship and non-relationship borrow-
ers. If unobservable diﬀerences between borrower types are correlated with the use of PSD,
our estimates are biased. We therefore include firm-fixed eﬀects to control for unobserv-
13When further distinguishing between interest-increasing, interest-decreasing, and mixed PSD, we find that
all three types of accounting-based PSD are positively correlated with relationship strength. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
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able time-invariant diﬀerences across firms, and analyze the use of PSD across loans within
firms. The results of linear probability models relating the use of accounting-based PSD to
measures of relationship strength are reported in Table 4.14
[Table 4 here]
Confirming our previous findings, relationship strength is positively and significantly
correlated with the use of accounting-based PSD, even after controlling for time-invariant
diﬀerences across firms. The economic magnitude is slightly lower when compared to the
cross-sectional results. We include firm-fixed eﬀects in all of the remaining analysis. However,
all results remain qualitatively similar if we exclude firm-fixed eﬀects and focus purely on
the cross-sectional diﬀerences.
The decision to form and stay in a lending relationship is clearly an endogenous choice,
which has been recognized in a number of recent studies, e.g. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010),
Bharath et al. (2011), Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Dass and Massa (2011), Degryse and
Ongena (2005), Norden and Weber (2010), and Petersen and Rajan (2002). We follow this
literature and use the geographic distance between the borrower and the lead lender as an
instrument for relationship strength. This instrument is likely to be correlated with the
decision to form a lending relationship but unlikely to be correlated with the decision to
14We use linear probability models because of the large number of fixed eﬀects. However, all results reported
in this paper remain virtually unchanged if we use logit models.
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include a performance-pricing provision in the loan contract. Lenders that are physically
closer to a borrower are more likely to have better information about a borrower, and are
hence more likely to become a relationship lender. We match the location of the borrowers’
and lenders’ headquarters, provided by Dealscan, to the MaxMind World Cities Database
to obtain information on the longitude and latitude.15 We are always able to identify the
lender and the borrower location in MaxMind if the information on the location is provided
by Dealscan. We treat observations as missing if the exact location of the lender or the
borrower is not specified in Dealscan, which reduces the sample by 2,804 observations. We
calculate the distance in miles between the borrower and the lead lender for each deal.16 We
follow Petersen and Rajan (2002) and address skewness in the distance measure by using
ln(1 +Distance) in the regressions.
Table 5 reports the results of the IV-estimation using linear probability models in com-
puting 2SLS estimates and correcting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.17 Consistent
with Bharath et al. (2011), we find that ln(1+Distance) is significantly negatively correlated
to all three proxies for lending relationship strength, confirming the validity of the inclusion
restriction. The results of the second stage regressions confirm our previous results that
15The MaxMind database contains geographical information for about 3 million places in 234 countries and
is publicly available at http://www.maxmind.com/app/worldcities.
16We use the same estimation formula as in Dass and Massa (2011). We assign the minimum distance to
the deal in case of multiple lead lenders. See the Appendix for further details.
17Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that this procedure yields consistent estimates. Several studies find
that linear probability models produce results similar to partial eﬀects from more precise models (see e.g.,
Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Katz et al. (2001)). However, our results are not sensitive to the question
of whether we use linear probability models or bivariate probit models as advocated by Heckman (1978).
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PSD contracts are more likely to be used in the presence of bank lending relationships. In
fact, PSD contracts are about 25% more likely to be used in repeated lending relationships
after we control for the endogeneity of the lending relationship, which is statistically and
economically highly significant.18
[Table 5 here]
Our results so far show that relationship lending is positively correlated with the use of
accounting-based PSD. To establish whether this positive correlation is due to hold-up, we
make use of the fact that the severity of the hold-up problem is likely to vary systematically
across diﬀerent types of borrowers. For example, more opaque borrowers have fewer financing
alternatives, so that these borrowers are more subject to hold-up. Following Bharath et al.
(2011), we use firm size as well as a dummy variable which equals one if the borrower does
not have a S&P rating (and zero otherwise) as proxies for firm opacity. Another proxy for
opacity is the number of analysts following the firm. Larger firms, rated firms, and firms
with larger analyst coverage are more likely to have multiple financing alternatives, and are
thus less "locked-in" in a bank lending relationship.
18As in other studies that use instruments in relationship lending settings, the economic significance strongly
increases in the IV-estimation. For example, Bharath et al. (2011) use IV regressions to examine the impact
of lending relationships on loan spreads and find that the eﬀect is more than 5 times stronger when using
the distance between borrower and lender as an instrument for relationship lending. Berger et al. (2005)
use IV regressions to examine the relationship between bank size and the exclusivity of bank-borrower
relationships. Instrumenting bank size, they show a large increase in economic importance of bank size
when compared to the OLS estimates.
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To test for the cross-sectional variation in the severity of the hold-up problem induced
by lending relationships, we estimate the following model.
PSDit = ↵i + ↵t + ↵Rat +  1 ⇤Rel(M)it +  2 ⇤BorrowerOpacityit
+  3 ⇤Rel(M)it ⇤BorrowerOpacityit +   ⇤Xit + ✏it
(4)
BorrowerOpacity stands for the above-mentioned proxies for borrower opacity. We in-
clude interaction variables of relationship strength and BorrowerOpacity to test for the
joint eﬀect of these two variables. Due to the high correlation of the interaction variables,
we include one variable at a time in the regressions. The results are reported in Table 6.
[Table 6 here]
The coeﬃcients of all interaction variables of borrower opacity are negative and statis-
tically significant, which supports our hypothesis that opacity in the presence of a lending
relationship increases the severity of hold-up, and hence the likelihood of using PSD.19
A significant portion of our sample consists of syndicated loans. Asquith et al. (2005)
argues that the use of PSD should be more likely in syndicated loans because their rene-
gotiation costs are higher. As reported in Table 6, we find the use of performance-pricing
provisions is indeed more likely in syndicated deals. According to Hypothesis 3, a relationship
19Our results are robust to using our other measures of relationship strength and to excluding all syndicated
loans from the sample. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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lead arranger should find it less beneficial to hold-up a borrower compared to a single lender
because the gains from hold-up would have to be shared with the rest of the syndicate. As a
result, the use of performance-pricing provisions should be less likely if the lead arranger is
a relationship bank. The results reported in Table 6 confirm this hypothesis. The coeﬃcient
on Rel(Dummy)*Syndication is indeed negative and statistically highly significant.
A potential concern is that the syndication results are driven by the largest banks in
the syndicated loan market. The market for syndication is dominated by three large banks
(see Ross (2010)). Performance-sensitive debt should be less frequently used if the lending
relationship is with one of these banks, because the top 3 banks are mostly transaction-
oriented, so that hold-up problems are less severe in relationships with these lenders. We
find that our results still hold if we exclude all loans made by the top 3 banks from our
sample.20
4.2. Performance-sensitive debt and covenants
In this section, we investigate whether there is a substitution eﬀect between the use of
performance pricing grids and the tightness of financial covenants. In particular, Hypothesis
4 states that PSD contracts should have less tight covenants because the pricing grid pre-
specifies the consequences of small changes in a borrower’s performance.
20These results are available from the authors upon request.
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[Table 7 here]
Table 7 compares the covenant threshold levels used in PSD and non-PSD contracts. We
find that PSD contracts have leverage and liquidity covenants with lower default thresholds
than non-PSD contracts. For example, the median Debt-to-EBITDA covenant level for
PSD contracts is 3.55, and 4 for non-PSD contracts. This appears not to be supportive
of Hypothesis 4. However, PSD and non-PSD are not unconditionally comparable, since
borrower characteristics diﬀer. A multivariate analysis is called for.
Furthermore, we now need to distinguish between interest-increasing and interest-decreasing
PSD, because only interest-increasing PSD contracts should have an eﬀect on covenant tight-
ness. Interest-decreasing performance-pricing provisions matter only if a borrower’s perfor-
mance improves. To ensure that covenants and a loan’s performance-pricing grid are based
on the same variable, we restrict our analysis to covenants on the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio,
which is the most frequently used performance measure in our sample.
Following Dichev and Skinner (2002), we calculate the covenant tightness as the absolute
diﬀerence between the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio at the initiation of the loan agreement and the
Debt-to-EBITDA covenant threshold, normalized by the standard deviation of the borrower’s
Debt-to-EBITDA ratio over the previous 8 years.21 A lower ratio indicates a tighter covenant.
21We lose observations because we require 8 years before the loan issue with non-missing observations on
the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio to calculate the Debt-to-EBITDA standard deviation.
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We then estimate the following regression by OLS.
T ightnessit = ↵i + ↵t + ↵Rat +  1 ⇤ IncreasingPSDit
+  2 ⇤MixedPSDit +  3 ⇤DecreasingPSDit +   ⇤Xit + ✏it
(5)
The dependent variable, T ightness, is the tightness of the Debt-to-EBITDA covenant
as defined above. X represents loan and borrower characteristics. As before, we control for
firm, time, loan purpose, loan type, and rating fixed eﬀects. IncreasingPSD is a dummy
variable which equals one if the loan contains a pricing grid on Debt-to-EBITDA that only
allows for interest rate increases. DecreasingPSD is a dummy variable which equals one if
the loan contains a pricing grid on Debt-to-EBITDA that allows for interest rate decreases
only, and MixedPSD is a dummy variable which equals one if the loan contains a pricing
grid on Debt-to-EBITDA that allows for both interest rate increases and decreases.
[Table 8 here]
As shown in Table 8, we find that interest-increasing PSD contracts have significantly less
tight Debt-to-EBITDA covenants than straight debt. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that performance-pricing aﬀects covenant tightness: small changes in the credit risk of the
borrower are regulated by performance-pricing provisions and not by tight covenants. We
further find that more highly levered borrowers have tighter Debt-to-EBITDA covenants.
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Borrowers with more growth opportunities have less tight covenants.22
5. Robustness: hold-up vs. signaling
Manso et al. (2010) show that PSD can be used as a signaling device to signal a firm’s
credit quality. Only borrowers who expect their credit ratings not to deteriorate are willing
to enter into contracts that stipulate interest rate increases should the firm’s credit rating
decline. To test whether signaling explains the use of PSD, Manso et al. (2010) analyze the
post-issue credit rating development for firms that issue PSD vs. firms that issue straight
debt. We use a similar methodology and further analyze the post-issue development of
the firm’s leverage ratio. We use the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio to measure leverage as this
is the most common performance measure used in accounting-based PSD contracts. We
distinguish between accounting-based and rating-based PSD in all specifications, because
our results in Table 3 suggest that the signaling hypothesis should predominantly apply to
rating-based PSD, while the hold-up hypothesis predominantly applies to accounting-based
PSD. In particular, we estimate the following regression.
 Performanceit+1 = ↵i + ↵t +  1 ⇤ PSD(Rating)it +  2 ⇤ PSD(Accounting)it
+   ⇤Xit + ✏it
(6)
22The accuracy and coverage of covenants reported in the Dealscan database has improved over time.
However, our results are not sensitive to this issue and remain virtually unchanged if we restrict the
sample to loans issued after 2000. These results are available upon request.
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 Performancei is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower’s credit rating im-
proves in the first k quarters after the loan issue and 0 otherwise (k = 4, 8). In an alternative
specification,  Performancei is the diﬀerence between the firm’s Debt-to-EBITDA ratio k
quarters after the loan issue and the firm’s Debt-to-EBITDA ratio at the time of the loan
issue (k = 4, 8). PSD(Rating) is a dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contains a
pricing grid on the borrower’s credit rating, while PSD(Accounting)i is a dummy variable
which equals one if the loan contains a pricing grid on an accounting measure. The regression
results are reported in Table 9.
[Table 9 here]
Consistent with the results reported by Manso et al. (2010), we find that firms are
more likely to experience a rating improvement up to two years after issuing rating-based
PSD relative to borrowers who issued regular debt. Furthermore, firms that issue rating-
based PSD see their leverage ratios decline by more than borrowers who issue straight debt.
However, these results do not hold for accounting-based PSD. Neither credit ratings nor
leverage ratios vary systematically after firms had issued accounting-based PSD. Accounting-
based PSD contracts are thus unlikely to be motivated by signaling considerations.
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6. Conclusion
Von Thadden (1995) argues that pre-specifying loan contract terms can be an eﬃcient way to
mitigate hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. An example is performance-
sensitive debt (PSD), which pre-specifies loan contract terms in events that would otherwise
trigger debt renegotiations. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that PSD is used to reduce
potential hold-up problems in bank lending relationships.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that accounting-based PSD contracts are 25%
more likely to be used in relationship lending arrangements, after controlling for the endo-
geneity of the lending relationship. This is especially the case if the borrower is opaque
and/or has fewer financing alternatives, both of which imply a greater potential for hold-up.
Syndicated deals are more likely to include performance-pricing provisions, which is consis-
tent with the renegotiation cost argument by Asquith et al. (2005). However, relationship
lenders as lead arrangers should find it less beneficial to hold-up a borrower as the gains
from hold-up would have to be shared with the other syndicate members. This reduces the
need for PSD. Indeed, we find that in syndicated relationship lending the use of PSD is less
likely.
We also find a substitution eﬀect between the pricing grid and the tightness of covenants.
The Debt-to-EBITDA covenants of interest rate increasing PSD contracts are less tight
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than the covenants of non-PSD contracts. This substitution eﬀect is consistent with the
recommendation by Von Thadden (1995) to pre-specify contract terms to mitigate hold-up.
In contrast to accounting-based PSD, we find no evidence that the use of rating-based
PSD is motivated by hold-up considerations. In fact, several results are consistent with
rating-based PSD used for signaling. Therefore we conclude that hold-up is likely an impor-
tant determinant in the decision to issue accounting-based PSD, while signaling motivates
the decision to issue rating-based PSD.
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Figure 1: Covenant Thresholds of PSD and non-PSD Contracts
This figure shows the Debt-to-EBITDA covenant threshold of debt with a performance-
pricing provision (at the end of the pricing grid) and the expected Debt-to-EBITDA
covenant threshold of debt without a performance pricing provision. All else equal the
covenant of regular debt is tighter than the covenant of PSD.
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Figure 2: Accounting-Based PSD
This figure shows the pricing grid of a loan issued by Urban Outfitters Inc in 2007. The
spread is contingent on the issuer’s Debt-to-EBITDA ratio. The Debt-to-EBITDA ratio at
the time of loan issue was 4. The initial spread paid was LIBOR + 150bp.
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Figure 3: Rating-Based PSD
This figure shows the pricing grid of a loan issued by IBM in March 2004. The loan spread
is a function of IBM’s S&P senior debt rating. IBM’s senior debt rating at the time of loan
issue was A+. The initial spread paid was LIBOR + 12bp.
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Table 2: PSD Contract Types
This table reports the types and frequencies of performance-pricing provisions used in our sample of PSD.
Frequency Observations
Panel A: Accounting-Based PSD
Debt-to-EBITDA 0.48 5859
User Condition 0.06 727
Multiple 0.04 518
Leverage 0.04 461
Senior Debt to Cash Flow 0.03 384
Fixed Charge Coverage 0.02 267
Other Accounting Measures 0.02 242
Outstandings 0.02 219
Debt-to-Tangible Net Worth 0.01 178
Interest Coverage 0.01 148
Panel B: Rating-Based PSD
Senior Debt Rating 0.26 3094
Other Credit Rating 0.00 21
Total 1.00 12134
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